
The U.S. public health system and primary healthcare
providers must be prepared to address various biological agents,
including pathogens that are rarely seen in the United States. High-priority
agents include organisms that pose a risk to national security because
they:
- can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person;
- result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major
public health impact;
- might cause public panic and social disruption;
- require special action for public health preparedness.
Category A Diseases/Agents
- Anthrax
- Botulism
- Plague
- Smallpox
- Tularemia
- Viral hemorrhagic fevers (filoviruses [e.g., Ebola, Marburg]
and arenaviruses
Category B Diseases/Agents
- Are moderately easy to disseminate
- Result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates
- Difficult to detect under current methods
Category B Biological Agents include:
- Brucellosis Epsilon Toxin
- Food Safety Threats (i.e. Salmonella)
- Glanders
- Meliodosis
- Psittacosis
- Q Fever
- Ricin
- Staphylococcal B
- Typhus Fever
- Vibrio Cholera
- Viral Encephalitis
- Water Safety Threats
Enhancing Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Post September 11
Interim actions for Medical & Public Health
Community
HOSPITALS
- Review all relevant disaster response plans and assure appropriately
designated staff are familiar with their content and strategies.
- Establish internal and external lines of communication. Assure
that medical staff are aware of the need to report suspicious
cases of illnesses to public health authorities, and are familiar
with who these authorities are. Have in place dedicated staff,
phones and fax machines to support rapid reporting.
- Hospital leaders should establish collaborative strategies for
communicating with neighboring hospitals, civic leaders, and public
health authorities.
- Quantify pharmaceutical and antibiotic supplies, both at central
and satellite facilities. Routinely update this list.
- Assess routine staffing and emergency call-up plans and assure
that these are supported with communication and transportation
strategies. Update the roster of essential personnel.
- Maintain ongoing primary and redundant communication systems.
- Assure that appropriate health care professionals (e.g., emergency
dept and urgent care dept personnel, infection control and infectious
diseases professionals) are aware of the importance of reporting
unusual disease presentations, disease clusters and atypical patterns
of hospital use and know the mechanisms to do reporting.
Other Resources for Hospitals
Smallpox:
What Every Clinician Should Know (online training)
PHYSICIANS
- Develop an increased awareness of the ongoing threat of bioterrorism.
- Become familiar with and develop a working knowledge of the
most likely and dangerous pathogens as viewed by the CDC (Note
link sites and fact sheets below)
- Become familiar with relevant lines of communication, and important
and emergency phone numbers (hospital epidemiologist, state epidemiologist,
local health department (may be city or county), and the CDC emergency
number (see below)
- Monitor disease patterns and patient volumes in clinics and
offices. Immediately notify the appropriate authorities if you
suspect an unusual event or need medical guidance.
- Patients can also be referred to the CDC public inquiry phone
number (see CDC numbers below)
regarding information about infectious diseases and bioterrorism
preparedness response efforts. Have referral numbers for mental
health and support services as needed.
- The Center is aware that a number of physicians have received
requests for prescriptions for antibiotics to be used in the event
of a bioterrorist attack. It should be known that Centers for
Disease Control maintains a National Pharmaceutical Stockpile
of large quantities of antibiotics and vaccines that could be
distributed in the event of an epidemic brought on by an act of
bioterrorism.
PUBLIC HEALTH
- Local and state public health agencies should collectively review
bioterrorism response plans. Attention should be given to assuring
the integration of response plans, including mechanisms for sharing
resources and personnel as needed.
- Syndromic surveillance procedures should be put in place to
monitor and detect atypical disease presentations and clusters.
Both passive and active surveillance systems should be examined
and refined across public health agencies and with reporting sources.
- Establish and maintain capacity to accept reports of unusual
disease events twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Assure
systems of continual, bi-directional communication between public
health agencies and hospitals under their purview.
- Appropriately trained disease investigation staff should be
available for immediate mobilization and deployment as needed.
Staffing levels should be reviewed and plans put in place to determine
non-urgent public health functions and clinics should it be necessary
to pull additional clinical and field staff for urgent investigation
activities.
- Assess communication systems, including procedures for immediately
contacting public health and political leaders. Systems should
be assessed to assure that appropriate authorities could be contacted
at the outset of an emergency. Mechanisms for maintaining ongoing
communication, including pagers, cell phones and wireless email
systems, should be assessed and tested. All staff that provide
on-call and disease investigation response and decision-making
should be adequately resourced for 24/7 communication.
- Hold regular meetings with all appropriate government and non-governments
agencies and organizations to continually review and refine plans.
INTERNET
RESOURCES
LOCAL & STATE
WWW.BIOTERRORISM.SLU.EDU
(Centers for the study of Bioterrorism & Emerging Infections)
www.dhss.state.mos.us
(Missouri dept. of Health and Senior Services)
http://www.homelandsecurity.state.mo.us/
(Missouri Department of Homeland Security)
http://www.sema.state.mo.us/semapage.htm
(Missouri State Emergency Managmeent System)
GOVERNMENT
www.cdc.gov
(Center for Disease and Prevention)
www.bt.cdc.gov
(CDC's bioterrorism pages)
www.smallpox.gov
(United States Department of Health & Human Services)
www.fema.gov
(Federal Emergency Management Agency)
www.fbi.gov
(Federal Bureau of Investigation)
www.smallpox.army.mil
(Military Vaccine Program)
PROFESSIONAL
www.cidrap.umm.edu
(Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy)
www.apic.org
(Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology)
www.naccho.org/PROJECT63.cfm
(National Association of County and City Health Officials)
www.apha.org
(American Public Health Association)
www.naemsp.org
(National Association of EMS Physicians)
www.emergency.com
(Crisis Conflict and Emergency Service News, Analysis & Reference)
http://www.hopkins-biodefense.org/
(Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies)
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